Introduction
In the process of negotiating international trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, new regional standards will be set in areas ranging from textiles to intellectual property. These standards may serve as a baseline for greater global governance structures such as through the World Trade Organization. In the regional talks, IP discussions have focused on debates over patent term lengths and data exclusivity rights. For example, based on United States law, the U.S. sought a twelve-year period of data exclusivity for complex biologic drugs derived from living organisms, while other countries argued that a shorter period is necessary to curb climbing drug prices. The final length was a seven-year period. No matter what balances are chosen in international agreements, however, we need to ensure that these carefully calibrated choices function properly in practice and have both strong mechanisms for enforcement and for rooting out system abuse.
In particular, with patents and pharmaceuticals driving much of the IP debate in TPP negotiations, we should ensure that regulators learn from our past mistakes. Merely coming to a conclusion on issues such as patentability and term length is not enough-flexible yet firm enforcement initiatives are needed to ensure that the TPP becomes a strong instrument of trade, not another regulatory mechanism to be picked apart by those wishing to exploit it. And as pharmaceutical game playing hits the press with the Turing and Valeant cases, where companies dramatically increased drug prices and attempted to obstruct generic competition, 1 it is important to consider the complexities in the U.S. system that create opportunities for these activities.
With this concern in mind, the paper will focus on two areas of U.S. law, both of which are creating challenges within the U.S. system. These are 1) the rapid emergence of NPEs, entities that do not make products but whose focus centers on licensing and litigating patents, and 2) behaviors to block the emergence of generic competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
In both of these areas, complexity breeds opportunity. The complexity of various litigation and regulatory schemes have created opportunities for strategic behaviors that are suboptimal. Many companies and patent lawyers in the United States, however, have become accustomed to these intricacies and to the accompanying strategic behaviors. And the solutions are not easy to identify. One has to choose carefully to avoid dampening the fires of innovation. The focus for all economies, however, should remain on the creation and production of products. Whatever type and stage of innovation industry may exist in an individual nation or in a region, policies that encourage the creation and production of innovative products will be more beneficial than policies that encourage intellectual property itself as a disembodied industry.
Problems and Responses
The United States patent system has helped to drive innovation in a variety of fields, from computers to pharmaceuticals and other life science inventions to semiconductors. Although a system of patent rights could be based on an inventor's moral or natural right to the invention, the approach of the U.S. system is explicitly utilitarian, that is, the U.S. grants patent rights for the purpose of promoting the "useful arts," 2 in other words, products.
In addition to the Constitutional language and history, the importance of the creation of new products to patent policy is evident in the Bayh-Dole Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1980. Bayh-Dole gave universities the power to file for patents on federally-funded inventions and also permitted them to license those inventions. The hope was that this licensing and commercialization power would spur the innovation of new products, furthering the societal benefit of spending federal dollars on research. Commentary at the time of the passage of the Act focused on the importance of the value proposition for taxpayers whose money is going to funding research at universities. In return, society should benefit in the form of the introduction of new products, and universities were judged to be better facilitators of that commercialization than allowing patent rights to remain with the federal government itself. Many of these cases are filed to exploit the cost and uncertainty of patent litigation in an effort to obtain a settlement, regardless of the merits of the patent claims. Patent litigation can easily cost $1 million or more, while the price of a settlement is often a mere fraction of litigation costs. 8 For many rational companies, settling is the logical choice, even in the face of serious concerns about whether the patent being wielded is valid or whether the company is actually infringing. NPEs are aware of this incentive to settle, particularly for small companies.
For example, one study suggested that more than half of unique defendants in NPE suits have less than $10 million in annual revenue, and more than three-quarters have annual revenues less than $100 million.
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The question remains, however, whether NPE activity actually hampering innovation. The data that are available, often from small-sample surveys, are not encouraging. These studies observe a disproportionate effect of NPEs on startups, little evidence of innovation transfer through NPE licensing, substantial legal costs, and additional harms to business and product development, including minimal "trickle down" of NPE revenue to original patentees.
Moreover, other studies have reported the use of pressure sales tactics and opportunistic behavior by NPEs.
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Despite evidence that NPEs are hampering, and at times downright abusing, a system meant to spur innovation, patent rights in general are essential to innovation. These rights would be useless if they cannot be enforced. Efforts to curb strategic behavior have been met with resistance, as universities, NPEs, and pharmaceutical companies have argued that such reform efforts would diminish the ability of patent holders to legitimately assert their rights. Of particular note, the U.S. semiconductor industry has been a vocal and active opponent of patent reform. Key semiconductor companies do not actually manufacture products but instead invent and create prototypes that the companies then license to others to manufacture. Thus, semiconductor companies occupy an unusual space, one not purely like large patent holding companies nor like traditional product producing companies-although some have complained that semiconductor company behavior at times strays across the line toward classic NPE tactics. In addition to the proliferation of the NPE business model, and the resulting fallout, the U.S. patent system has struggled with another problem in the pharmaceutical industry:
manipulations that block or delay the introduction of generic drugs. 12 Competition from generic drugs is immensely powerful in lowering the price of prescription medications in the U.S. When a generic enters a monopoly market, the drug is normally priced at 80% of the cost of the brandname drug within six months of launch. enormous profits and expending far less money and effort than is required to develop new drugs.
Even a few months of delay-and thus a few additional months of monopoly profits-can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, so the temptation is clear.
To block generic entry, companies are using ever more clever and complicated strategies to extend periods of monopoly and duopoly sales. Not all generic entry disputes are concerning or even malicious in nature. Hatch-Waxman provides a system by which prospective generic manufacturers can challenge brand-name patents even before patent expiration, and when companies preserve their existing exclusivity by reasserting the validity of their patents, that behavior is appropriate and fully in line with the goals of intellectual property. After all, if patent rights were found to have no actual enforcement power in practice-and generics could enter at any point-no one would see patents as providing a legitimate incentive for innovation.
However, when pharmaceutical firms use tactics to unlawfully prevent generic entry-or block generics from even challenging brand-name companies-the behavior undermines the patent system by imposing costs on society. The public loses billions of dollars in savings, patients are unable to afford prescriptions that would otherwise have generic equivalents, and resources are diverted away from actual innovation activities such as drug development.
At first, strategies to prevent generic entry took the form of "pay-for-delay" settlements:
brand-name pharmaceutical companies would pay generic competitors to stay out of the market, essentially providing the generic a share of the monopoly profits greater than the generic would earn in a duopoly or competitive market. While pure cash pay-for-delay deals have begun to lose prominence, especially as they face suspicion from government agencies, pharmaceutical companies have made settlements involving generic delay by using more opaque forms of payment. These deals can involve settling multiple cases at once to mask the value being transferred or deals where a generic company is overpaid to promote, manufacture, or supply materials for drugs sold by the brand-name company in exchange for generic delay.
New tactics no longer focus on making deals with would-be generics; instead, the goal is to obstruct generics by using trivial or minor drug modifications, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration processes, and regulatory abuse to extend monopoly franchises and prevent generic access. In many instances, the timing and deployment of these tactics seem clearly geared toward generic delay, hidden behind ulterior motives of safety concerns or improved drug efficiency. Strategies include filing "citizen petitions" with the FDA cautioning against on generic approval with the knowldege that even a baseless petition will take months to review and deny. Other strategies include "REMS"-based delay where a pharmaceutical company cites FDA-imposed safety restrictions as a reason for not providing samples to generic manufacturers.
Others involve "product hopping" schemes where a company switches consumers to a slightly different form of an existing drug (e.g. extended-release, a new tablet formulation) just before generic entry to severely constrain the market for the generic. And finally, companies engage in "multiplicity tactics," whereby a number of these strategies are deployed at once. These mechanisms, and the complex legislative and regulatory framework that allow for their development, help to maintain pharmaceutical pricing and avoid competitive entry. Further, Hatch-Waxman does not have the proper enforcement safeguards against abuse. Rather, most changes to the pathway have been "hole-plugging" measures that patch over long-standing problems, rather than forward-looking measures that prevent further exploitation.
Conclusion
provided fertile ground for strategic behavior that can have negative innovative effects. These types of complexity tend to reward large players and repeat players, at the expense of smallerand sometimes more innovative-entities. Regardless of the level of innovative industry for any nation, creation of new products is the optimal developmental approach. As we develop regional and global intellectual property frameworks, the focus should be on streamlining complexity and the creation of new products, rather than the creation of new intellectual property games and stripped markets. In this era of mega-regionalism, we want to export the strengths of the U.S.
intellectual property system and not its flaws to the world.
